

SwA Panel: Use Cases, Standards and Roadmap for Enterprise Security Automation


Automation Activities for Securing the Enterprise

Robert A. Martin 27 September 2010





A Notional Enterprise Information Technology Infrastructure



Securing the Enterprise...









Cognitive and Cyber Speed Activities & Info (SCAP)


- CVE identifiers require analysts to investigate/correlate...
 - Which enables tools to correlate at cyber speed…
- OVAL definitions require analysts to define criteria...
 - Which enables checking systems for user defined content at cyber speed...
- CVSS scores require analysts to assign vector values...
 - Which enables identifying severity and following a priori guidance on risk tolerance at cyber speed...
- CPE names require vendors/analysts to assign names...
 - Which allows correlating platform information at cyber speed...
- CCE identifiers require analysts/vendors to identify controls...
 - Which allows correlating settings with desired settings at cyber speed...
- XCCDF requires analysts to craft policy statements...
 - Which allows multiple tools to follow and report against user defined content at cyber speed…
- OCIL requires analysts to craft questionnaires...
 - Which allows multiple tools to ask and report against user defined content at cyber speed...





SCAP's Automation Requires:

- Consistent input from Cognitive activities feeding SCAP
- Structured input & output to and from those Cognitive activities
- Universal definition of concepts across SCAP elements

























CVSS CCE & OVXL ... CPE XCCDF




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SCAP and the model beneath it...




A platform:


- Commercial or Open Source Software
 - OVAL Systems Characteristics File
 - Core Schema
 - Component Schema
 - CPE names
 - Vulnerabilities
 - CVE identifiers
 - CVSS scores
 - OVAL definitions
 - Misconfigurations
 - CCE identifiers
 - OVAL definitions







Assets -**Vulnerabilities** Configuration Reporting.










Assessment
of System
Development,
Integration, &
Sustainment
Activities
and
Certification &
Accreditation

SWAAP

Development & Sustainment Security Management Processes



Enterprise IT Change Management

ERAP

Centralized Reporting

Enterprise IT Asset Management

Operational Enterprise Networks

ECAP


Other things to model...





A platform:


- Role/Mission
- Hardware Information
 - Architecture
 - Disks, Memory, Comms, Input Devices
 - Authentification Capabilities
- Organically Developed Software
 - Weaknesses Evaluated For
 - CWE IDs
 - CAPEC IDs
 - Validation Methods
 - Structured Assurance Case
 - 3rd Party Testing
- Network Configuration Information
 - Ports/Protocols Settings






Enterprise Information Technology Infrastructures Are There to Support Missions and Enterprise Capabilities






Mission Modeling: using BPMN (Business Process Modeling Notation) to represent missions and their cyber dependencies





Example Incident: Remote failure interrupts access to a systems status sources








DoDAF Version 2.0 Metamodel







Software Assurance Automation Protocol (SwAAP)























- For measuring & enumerating software weaknesses and the assurance cases.
 - Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
 - Common Attack Pattern Enumeration & Classification (CAPEC)
 - Malware Attribute Enumeration & Characterization (MAEC)
 - Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS)
 - OMG Software Assurance Evidence Metamodel (OMG SAEM)
 - OMG Arguementation Metatmodel (OMG ARG)
 - OMG Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (OMG SACM)
 - Software Assurance Findings Expression Schema (SAFES)
 - NIST SAMATE's "Software Label"
 - OMG Structured Metrics Metamodel (OMG SMM)
 - ISO "Assurance Case" 15026 (ISO 15026)
 - OMG Knowledge Discovery Metamodel (OMG KDM)
 - OMG Abstract Syntax Tree Metamodel (OMG ASTM)
 - plus SCAP to capture "accredited" system CPEs and CCE settings?
 - OVAL checks for capturing "finger print" of software applications to address supply-chain risk measurement?



Questions Can Be Addressed To:

ramartin@mitre.org

